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 10  The Effect of Speaker-Specific Information on Pragmatic Inferences
Daniel Grodner and Julie C. Sedivy
It is commonplace to observe that utterances can convey more information 
than they explicitly encode. Indeed, the field of pragmatics has grown from the 
insight that speakers exploit communicative conventions in order to say more 
with less. Less attention has been paid to the burden this places on perceivers. 
Because speakers’ meanings are underspecified, perceivers must infer implicit 
content in order to interpret, and successfully situate, utterances within the cur-
rent discourse. These inferences1 appeal to many types of knowledge, includ-
ing entailment relations, world knowledge, and discourse context. The last of 
these presents a particular challenge to investigators because contexts are dy-
namic and utterance meaning can be sensitive to context. For instance, the 
u tterance in (2) implies something like (2a) if it is a response to (1a) and some-
thing like (2b) if it is a response to (1b).2
(1) a. What time is it?
 b. How good is the party?
(2) Some guests are already leaving.
 a. It must be late.
 b. The party is not much fun.
The ease and the prevalence of such inferences facilitate efficient communica-
tion but create difficulty for models of language understanding. A central 
p uzzle is how the extrasentential context is combined with intrasentential in-
formation to ultimately yield an interpretation of a sentence.
The present paper addresses this issue by exploring a particular dependency 
between the referential environment and linguistic form. Suppose a speaker 
wishes to refer to one member of a set of entities belonging to the same nomi-
nal category in the current discourse. The speaker must use a modified expres-
sion in order to refer successfully. For instance, if one cup is the intended 
referent in a context containing two cups, the speaker must use a restrictive 
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modifier, such as “the cup on the left” or “the red cup.” Significantly, this de-
pendence appears to be bidirectional. When a listener encounters a restrictively 
modified referential description, such as the tall cup, two sets are invoked in 
the immediate discourse: a target set corresponding to the literal denotation of 
the expression (e.g., a tall cup) and a contrast set containing an entity of the 
same type as the noun but differing along the dimension picked out by the ad-
jective (e.g., a short cup).
Indirect evidence for the contrastive inference comes from studies of struc-
tural ambiguity resolution. In general, the sentence-processing mechanism 
prefers syntactic alternatives that contain simple unmodified descriptions when 
given the option. Crain and Steedman (1985) proposed that this preference 
stems from the fact that modified structures occasion costly changes to the 
discourse model. As an illustration, consider the string The horse raced past 
the barn . . . , which is ambiguous between a main clause containing a simple 
NP subject and a reduced relative clause (RC) modifying the subject. The sim-
ple NP reading presupposes the existence of a single referent set, namely a 
horse, in the current discourse model. The complex NP reading involves the 
projection of an additional contrasting set of entities that share the properties 
denoted by the head noun but differ by virtue of the property expressed in the 
modifier. For the present example this corresponds to a non-empty set of horses 
that were not raced past the barn. In a null context, the modified NP reading 
requires the greatest number of additions to the current discourse model in 
o rder to be felicitous. Thus, the simple NP is preferred. There is evidence that 
by establishing appropriate referent and contrast sets it is possible to alter pars-
ing preferences (Altmann, Garnham, and Dennis 1992; Altmann and Steedman 
1988; Sedivy 2002; Spivey-Knowlton and Tanenhaus 1994).
More direct evidence of contrastive inference comes from studies that mon-
itor perceivers’ eye movements as they rearrange objects according to spoken 
instructions (Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, and Sedivy 1995; Se-
divy, Tanenhaus, Chambers, and Carlson 1999; Sedivy 2003). Sedivy et al. had 
individuals respond to instructions containing a prenominally modified phrase, 
such as “Pick up the tall cup.” Object arrays consisted of four entities: a target 
object (e.g., a tall cup), a competitor from a different nominal category that 
shared the modifier property of the target (e.g., a tall pitcher), an irrelevant 
distracter object, and either a contrasting object of the same category as the 
target but possessing a distinct modifier property (e.g., a short cup) or a second 
distracter. Figure 10.1 depicts a sample display. Note that an indeterminacy is 
introduced when the modifier is uttered. The input to this point is compatible 
with reference to either the target or the competitor. If perceivers are driven by 
the literal meaning of the modifier, their attention could be directed to either 
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referent. However, if they interpret the modifier contrastively, they should attend 
to the target object, as this object requires a modified description in order to 
distinguish it from the contrasting object of the same category. Consistent with 
this, individuals made earlier fixations on the target and fewer fixations on the 
competitor in the presence of a contextual contrast. The influence of referential 
contrast on eye movements has been observed extremely early in the speech 
stream — within 200 msec of the onset of the head noun (Sedivy 2003). In light 
of estimates that saccadic eye movements are planned 150 –200 msec before 
being launched (Matin, Shao, and Boff 1993), restrictive modifiers can generate 
the expectation for referential contrast well before the nominal head can be iden-
tified. Because the speech input does not uniquely isolate the target before utter-
ance of the noun, perceivers’ fixations must be guided by inferential content.
Two types of accounts have been forwarded to explain the effect of d iscourse 
contrast: form-based and pragmatic. Form-based accounts attribute the con-
trastive inference to the conventional content of restrictively modified descrip-
tions. This type of explanation has the advantage that it requires consideration 
of information contained only within the sentence. Perceivers would not have 
to deliberate over various types of extrasentential information. This comports 
well with the speed and the automaticity of contrast effects.
One way for the conventional meaning to engender a contrastive inference 
is if definite modified NP structures conventionally presuppose contrasting 
Figure 10.1
Sample contrast condition display for the target instruction “Pick up the tall glass.” 
Each display contained four objects. In the “no contrast” display the contrast was re-
placed by a second distracter object.
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e ntities in much the same way that a definite description might be said to con-
ventionally presuppose uniqueness of reference. This idea was suggested by 
Steedman and Altmann (1989). However, this account is difficult to maintain 
in light of examples like (3), which indicate that the contrastive inference is 
cancelable in a way that conventionally expressed content is not (Grice 1975; 
Sadock 1978).
(3) Use the tall cup because there are no other cups.
Perhaps a more plausible way to play out a form-based presuppositional ac-
count is to propose that modificational content is by default placed in focus. 
Focused material is typically analyzed as foregrounded against a background 
of contrasting alternatives (Rooth 1985, 1992). Thus, for instance, focusing the 
modifier for the string above as in The horse RACED PAST THE BARN . . . 
would make prominent a single horse that was raced past the barn against a 
presupposed background of a set of horses that were not raced past the barn. 
Note that a focus-mediated presuppositional account is consistent with the oc-
currence of modifiers in the absence of referential contrast. This is because 
modifiers need not always be placed in focus, and unfocused material is not 
predicted to generate a set of alternatives.
Reading-time results from studies examining syntactic ambiguities lend 
some support to the focus-mediated interpretation of referential effects. In par-
ticular, the presence of the overt focus operator “only” can induce a preference 
for ambiguous material to be analyzed as a nominal modifier ( Ni, Crain, and 
Shankweiler 1996; Sedivy 2002; but see Clifton, Bock, and Radó 2000). How-
ever, it is difficult to extend this explanation to spoken stimuli involving pre-
nominal modification (e.g. “Pick up the tall cup.”). For these utterances, focus 
marking would result in greatest prominence on the adjective. However, ref-
erential contrast effects were found with spoken stimuli in which greatest 
prominence occurred on the head noun, according to rules of nuclear stress 
placement. Hence, the referential-contrast effect does not seem to depend on 
focus marking.
Another form-based possibility is that the effect of referential contrast is 
lexically driven. For instance, scalar adjectives, such as tall, are inherently re-
lational and must be evaluated relative to a contextually salient comparison 
class. Clearly what counts as tall for a child is very different from what counts 
as tall for an elephant (Siegel 1980; Bierwisch 1987). It might be a lexical 
 idio syncrasy of scalar modifiers that they cause perceivers to attend inordi-
nately to the discourse context and, thereby, receive contrastive interpretations. 
This provides an account for the referential-contrast effect with scalar adjec-
tives, but does not extend to referential effects with other modifiers, such as the 
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postnominal modification involved in syntactic ambiguity resolution, or even 
referential effects found for non-scalar modifiers, such as modifiers denoting 
material properties (Sedivy 2001). Thus, at the very least, any form-based ap-
proach seems to require a combination of at least two somewhat distinct mech-
anisms to account for the range of effects observed to date.
Perhaps the most striking evidence against any of the above accounts, either 
singly or in combination, is evidence that whether a modifier invokes a contrast 
can depend on what it modifies. Sedivy (2003) examined the processing of 
descriptions that contained prenominal color modifiers in the presence or ab-
sence of a contrasting object. In one condition, the adjective denoted a property 
that was highly predictable from the noun category, as in “the yellow banana.” 
In another, the color property was not strongly associated with the noun, as in 
“the yellow cup.” The presence of a contextual contrast aided individuals in 
identifying objects whose colors were predictable. For instance, individuals 
more quickly identified a yellow banana, and directed fewer eye movements to 
other yellow objects in the display, in the presence of a green banana. How-
ever, there was no benefit of contextual contrast conferred when identifying 
objects whose color properties were unpredictable. Individuals’ eye move-
ments did not converge more quickly on a yellow cup in the presence of a 
green cup. The contrastive inference is therefore not an inherent part of the 
meaning of the color modifier but rather is related to its informativity with re-
spect to the entity being modified.
Such informativity effects are predicted to arise within a pragmatic expla-
nation of referential contrast (Clifton and Ferreira 1989; Sedivy 2003). The 
pragmatic account claims that contrastive inferences arise because the use of a 
restrictive modifier is embedded in a collaborative communicative exchange. 
There is an understanding between discourse participants that speakers are 
only as informative as they need to be. This follows from Grice’s second 
maxim of quantity (1975, p. 26): “Don’t make your contribution more infor-
mative than is required for the purposes of the present exchange.” A simple NP 
would suffice to pick out the intended referent in a context with only one entity. 
The use of a more prolix or unusual form indicates that a different state of af-
fairs prevails (see Levinson 2000 for an extended treatment of this idea). The 
most natural way to make the inclusion of the modifier informative is to as-
cribe a distinguishing function to it. To apply this logic, perceivers must reason 
counterfactually about what the speaker could have said but chose not to say.
In support of the pragmatic view, contrastive inferences arise only for adjec-
tive types that are not used to label objects in isolation. Scalar modifiers and 
predictable color modifiers are rarely encoded in default descriptions, whereas 
unpredictable color modifiers are frequently encoded in default descriptions 
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(Sedivy 2000, 2002). The connection between inferential patterns in com-
prehension and distributions in production suggests that perceivers actively 
generate expectations as to what referential form a speaker will opt for in 
s electing an entity. Deviations from those expectations result in pragmatic 
i nferences.
The appeal of this Gricean mechanism is that it is capable of adapting ap-
propriately to a wide range of stimulus conditions. It also provides a unified 
explanation for all the referential-context effects found to date. On the other 
hand, it requires a set of as yet unspecified computations that appeal to het-
erogeneous and potentially unconstrained knowledge bases. Many different 
factors might be weighed in deciding whether a modified form should be inter-
preted contrastively. These include the intrinsic properties of a referent, the 
discourse context, the reliability of the speaker, the intentions of the speaker, 
the common background of the interlocutors, the goals of the communicative 
situation, and expectations about alternative forms. It is unlikely that p erceivers 
could consider all of these in the limited time frame in which contextual con-
trast effects have been observed. In fact, Clifton and Ferreira argued that such 
conversational implicatures would be too cumbersome for individuals to en-
gage in on-line, and that, hence, an expeditious parser would not consider such 
information in initial interpretive processes.
The studies described above establish only that listeners are sensitive to the 
use of default descriptions when inferring a contrast. This need not imply that 
individuals are engaged in full-blown Gricean reasoning. It may be that certain 
inferential steps are short-circuited. This resembles the position of the so-
called neo-Griceans (Gazdar 1979; Horn 1984; Levinson 2000). These re-
searchers propose a principled division between conversational implicatures 
that are generalized across situations and those that are specific to certain situ-
ations. For instance, the implicatures in (2a) and (2b) are dependent on the 
particular context in which (2) is uttered. However, the scalar implicature in 
(2c) is present across of the vast majority of discourses.
(2) c. Not all of the guests are leaving.
Levinson (2000) hypothesizes that generalized implicatures like this one form 
part of the meaning for certain utterance types, whereas particularized implica-
tures are associated with utterance tokens. For quantity-based implicatures, the 
form type selected by a speaker is located on an informativity scale with re-
spect to some anticipated reference type (Horn 1971, 1989). This comparison 
process can generate an implicature when the selected form is less informative 
than an alternative. For instance, the selection of “some” in (2) triggers a com-
parison with the more informative scalar alternative “all.” The failure to use 
the more constraining alternative results in the implicature (2c). Analogously, 
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contrastive inferences arise when the form selected is more informative than an 
anticipated alternative.
The generality and simplicity of this comparison mechanism suggest that 
quantity-based inferences could arise through automatic processes rather than 
being computed on the fly. If the routines for projecting a contrast are precom-
piled in this way, this could explain the immediacy with which the visual con-
text influences reference resolution. It also predicts that generalized inferences 
might be harder to block or suspend than particularized ones such as (2a) and 
(2b). Motivated by computational constraints, Jurafsky (2003) outlines a sim-
ilar idea to explain how perceivers interpret what speech act a speaker intended 
to perform. In this model, perceivers use surface cues probabilistically to 
r ealize the illocutionary force of an utterance. Because the implicit content 
arises from statistical associations, cues that are highly reliable indicators of 
implicit content should be harder to ignore. In the present example, this reason-
ing might predict an insensitivity to the situation in which the modifier is used. 
Because default descriptions are statically linked with individual referents, 
contrastive inferences do not require that perceivers consider the particular 
circumstances of the immediate discourse. Perceivers might reflexively infer a 
contrast whenever the speaker deviates from a stored default form.
An alternative is proposed by Carston (1998). Building on the work of Sper-
ber and Wilson (1986), he claims that all conversational inferences are actively 
constructed and therefore particularized to their circumstances. Such nonce 
inference is clearly a necessary component of language comprehension in 
o rder to explain the robustness of the inferences made in (2a) and (2b). What 
is at issue is whether this nonce mechanism is involved in the earliest stages of 
interpretive processing.
The experiment described below makes an effort to distinguish the short-
circuited and nonce inference positions by manipulating characteristics idio-
syncratic to a particular speaker — specifically, the degree to which the speaker 
could be considered to be adhering to normative conversational principles. If 
contrastive inferences are generalized implicatures triggered by deviations 
from a default form, the effect of contrast should be impervious to this ma-
nipulation, at least with respect to initial referential commitments. On the other 
hand, if contrastive inferences are the product of pragmatic reasoning about 
particular discourse situations, there should be a noticeable effect when the 
circumstances are altered in this critical way.
Experiment
There is a great deal of evidence that speakers make many accommodations 
that demonstrate their sensitivity to the specific needs of a listener. For e xample, 
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experts adjust referential forms appropriately to the knowledge state of the ad-
dressee (Isaacs and Clark 1987), and speakers hyper-articulate to make speech 
clearer under conditions where intelligibility is likely to be reduced for a par-
ticular listener (Bradlow 2002). Knowledge specific to a conversational part-
ner is also a potentially powerful constraint in comprehension. For instance, 
suppose (4) is uttered discourse initially.
(4) He’s such a jerk.
Resolving the antecedent of the pronoun depends critically on discerning what 
potential referent is most likely to be salient for the individual speaker. In ex-
treme cases, an utterance such as (4) may be effortlessly resolved even when 
uttered out of the blue as the first interaction in days or even weeks between 
interlocutors, and with no particular supporting visual context if the interlocu-
tors share knowledge of some male person extraordinarily inclined to behave 
badly.
Few studies have investigated the moment-to-moment application of 
speaker-related knowledge in comprehension. The few studies that have inves-
tigated this have employed head-mounted eye tracking to monitor visual atten-
tion as listeners perform a target-identification task. One important finding that 
emerges from this work is that listeners are sensitive to the speaker’s perspec-
tive in the referential discourse. Listeners exhibit preferential consideration for 
entities in the shared referential environment over items to which they have 
privileged access (Hanna, Tanenhaus, and Trueswell 2003; Nadig and Sedivy 
2002; but see Barr and Keysar 2002 and Barr 2003). Hanna et al. (2003) pro-
vide a particularly powerful illustration of this ability. They show that listeners 
are sensitive to the speaker’s discourse model even when it is at odds with the 
perceptually available referential environment. These findings illustrate that 
speaker-based information can be recruited very quickly to resolve potential 
referential indeterminacies. It is interesting to note, however, that these studies 
exploit the conventional properties of the referring expression (in these cases, 
the uniqueness requirement of definite descriptions) to signal the need to con-
strain reference. It has been argued that circumscribing a referential domain is 
central to communication (Chambers et al. 2004; Hanna et al. 2003; Tanenhaus 
2003). The requirement that definite descriptions refer to a uniquely identifi-
able entity, when combined with an experimental scenario in which satisfying 
this requirement necessitates accessing speaker-based information, creates op-
timal conditions for observing powerful and rapid speaker-based effects.
It is interesting to extend such research to the question of whether perceivers 
access speaker-based information even when the conventional properties of 
the referring expression can be satisfied without recourse to speaker-based 
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i nformation. Metzing and Brennan (2003) reported the use of speaker-based 
knowledge to interpret referring expressions in just such a situation. They 
found that perceivers were sensitive to the way a particular speaker had chosen 
to refer to an object in the past, and that they used this information inferen-
tially. When the same speaker used a different but equally plausible label for an 
item, looks to that object were delayed, and there were more fixations to other 
objects in the display before converging on the target referent. Participants 
expected the new label to refer to a new object and interrogated the scene in an 
attempt to find it. This may have indicated that a pragmatic inference was ar-
rived at when individuals tried to find a relevant function for the departure 
from an entrained label (cf. Grice’s maxim of manner). No such penalty was 
observed when a new speaker used the novel label. Participants were equally 
quick to respond to the new or the old label when the label was uttered by a 
new speaker. However, one must be cautious before concluding that these find-
ings demonstrate immediate use of speaker identity in inferencing. On aver-
age, the first fixations to the target object were launched approximately one 
second after the onset of the referring expression. This is slower than the laten-
cies seen in comparable tasks, and it raises the possibility that participants 
a dopted specialized strategies or that eye movements were being driven by 
non-primary processes. Still, it demonstrates that individuals are capable of 
applying the pragmatic expectation that a speaker will use a specific entrained 
description at some point in reference resolution.
The present experiment extends the result of Metzing and Brennan by look-
ing at whether perceivers generate expectations about the type of referring 
e xpression a speaker will use and then use this as the basis for generating infer-
ences of referential contrast. We constructed a scenario in which a particular 
speaker does not obey the standard communicative conventions. Specifically, 
a number of cues were given to indicate that the speaker’s use of restrictive 
modification was not a reliable signal of the presence of a contextual contrast. 
If the contrastive inference is predicated on the perceiver’s belief that the 
speaker rationally chose one linguistic form over another, the contrast effect 
should be defeated in this situation. If instead the inference is a reflex of gen-
eralized and automatic informativity expectations, this manipulation should 
not affect the projection of a contrast, and the presence of a contextual contrast 
should aid listeners in identifying the target.
A further manipulation in the present study was to look at the differential 
properties of material and scalar modifiers. Material properties are not context 
dependent in the same way as scalar properties. Nevertheless, just as for scalar 
adjectives and redundant color adjectives, the referents for descriptions con-
taining material modifiers are easier to identify in the presence of a contextual 
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contrast (Sedivy 2001). One possibility is that the different modifiers engender 
a contrastive inference in disparate ways. Adjectives that denote inherently 
relational properties, such as scalar terms, might engender a contrast effect as 
a result of their lexical semantics. Modifiers that have no special relation to the 
context of their use, such as material and color terms, might instead convey 
contrast pragmatically. If so, then the expectation for contextual contrast given 
by scalar terms might be less susceptible to being blocked by the present prag-
matic manipulation than the expectation for contextual contrast given by mate-
rial items.
Participants
Thirty-one members of the Brown University community were paid for their 
participation in the experiment. Each was a native speaker of English and had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All were naive with respect to the goals 
of the experiment.
Materials and Design
The methodology and the design were adapted from Sedivy et al. (1999). Par-
ticipants were asked to manipulate arrays of four objects according to a set of 
prerecorded instructions. Twenty stimulus sets similar to that illustrated in fig-
ure 10.1 were constructed. For each display array there were two to four in-
structions. A critical instruction containing a prenominally modified noun (e.g., 
“Pick up the tall cup”) always occurred first in the series. In ten of the twenty 
critical phrases, the prenominal modifier referred to a scalar property. For the 
other ten, the modifier described a material property (e.g., “the glass mug”). 
Table 10.1 lists the contrast, competitor, and target objects for the stimuli. For 
the scalar items, the competitor object was selected so that it was a better ex-
emplar of the modifier property than the target (e.g., an unusually tall pitcher). 
Thus, if there was an early bias toward the literal interpretation of the adjective, 
it should have resulted in elevated erroneous looks to the competitor rather 
than the target. This could not be done for the material items. Half of the ex-
perimental items in each session included a contrasting object, and half did not. 
Each participant saw only the contrast variant or the no-contrast variant of any 
stimulus set. An additional ten trials contained displays that were like those in 
the contrast condition except that a modified noun was used to refer to the 
competitor item. These counterbalancing trials were intended to ensure that 
individuals would not be cued to expect a modified noun to refer to a member 
of the contrasting pair. Stimuli and counterbalancing trials were pseudoran-
domly ordered with 26 filler trials.
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Table 10.1
Experimental items employed in the study.
Modifier
type Target Contrast Competitor Distracter 1 Distracter 2
Scalar Small pad Large pad Small doll Razor Shampoo
Scalar Thin 
marker







Thick book Rag Horseshoe
Scalar Tall cup Short cup Tall pitcher Eraser Diskette
Scalar Narrow 
Post-its









Long spatula Toy shovel Lotion
Scalar Tall doll Short doll Tall mug Black pen Yellow 
folder
Scalar Long spoon Short spoon Short pencil Peach Quarter
Scalar Wide tape Narrow tape Wide belt Banana Red pencil
Scalar Fat crayon Thin crayon Fat marker Egg Tupperware





Wool glove Leather 
wallet
Blue bow Tape 
measure
Material Paper plate Plastic plate Paper bag Salt shaker Shot glass
Material Porcelain 
bowl





Metal spoon Plastic comb Tie Battery
Material Styrofoam 
ball
Rubber ball Styrofoam 
cup
Comb Lego
Material Metal ladle Plastic ladle Metal pan Orange Toy octopus






Wood ruler Ribbon 
spool
Mirror
Material Glass mug Ceramic mug Glass vase Pencil Floss
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All participants were told that the experimental instructions had been gener-
ated by “an individual who was asked to direct a listener through a sequence of 
object configurations” and that the experiment had been designed to test how 
effectively individual speakers were able to convey instructions by observing 
a perceiver’s responses. Fifteen participants were assigned to the reliable-
speaker condition. The remaining sixteen participants were assigned to the 
unreliable-speaker condition. The impression of unreliability was conveyed in 
three ways. First, participants were told that the speaker who had recorded the 
instructions had an “impairment that caused language and social problems.” 
Second, the speaker described objects and locations erroneously. Five times 
over the course of the experiment an object was mislabeled. (For instance, a 
toothbrush was called a “hairbrush.”) On three occasions the instructions di-
rected the perceiver to move an object to a location that did not exist. (For in-
stance, a destination might be described as above object A and below object B, 
when in fact object B was below object A.) Both of these error types occurred 
in a minority of the nearly 200 instructions. Third, the speaker consistently 
used over-informative descriptions. There were 234 nonpronominal references 
where an unmodified form would have sufficed to indicate the object of in-
terest. Of these, 197 contained a superfluous modifier. The remaining 37 de-
scriptions were unmodified nominal descriptions.
Note that the presence of the modifier was not a reliable cue to the presence 
of a contextual contrast for the reliable speakers either. Overall, participants in 
the reliable-speaker condition heard thirty prenominally modified descriptions: 
the twenty stimuli and ten counterbalancing trials (the latter included with the 
specific intent of eliminating any within-experiment correlations between 
modification and contrastive reference). For each participant, only ten of these 
(the number of stimuli presented in the contrast condition) were uttered in the 
presence of a contextual contrast for the target. Although the reliable speaker 
generated far fewer modified forms than the unreliable speaker (30 versus 
207), there was no contingency between modification and contextual contrast 
over the course of the experiment for either speaker.
To avoid placing prominence on the prenominal modifier, nuclear stress was 
placed on the head noun of the NP in critical instructions. Durations of the 
adjective and noun are listed in table 10.2. Note that critical regions were 
c omparable across the unreliable-speaker conditions and the reliable-speaker 
conditions.
Procedure
Display changes took approximately 5 seconds, and participants were permit-
ted to watch the display as it was being changed. Every display contained a 
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centrally located fixation cross. Each trial began with a request for the subject 
to look at the cross, and participants were instructed to rest their eyes on the 
central cross between instructions. This was done so that eye movements to the 
target objects could be measured from a default position that was equidistant 
from all of the objects in the display. Participants were told to follow the in-
structions as quickly and accurately as they could.
While the participant followed instructions to move objects in the work-
space, eye-movement data were recorded using a lightweight ISCAN head-
mounted video-based tracking system. The camera provided an infrared image 
of the eye, and determined monocular eye position by monitoring the locations 
of the center of the pupil and the cornea reflection. A scene camera was mounted 
on the side of the helmet, providing an image of the subject’s field of view. 
Calibration was carefully monitored throughout each trial, and minor adjust-
ments were occasionally made between trials. A VCR record consisting of 
the instructions recorded with a microphone and the participant’s moment-by-
moment gaze fixation superimposed over the scene-camera image, with time-
code stamps at 30 Hz, was made for each experimental trial. Because the scene 
camera was mounted onto the helmet itself, and moved with the participant’s 
head, the VCR record took into account any head movements made by the 
participant, allowing for unrestricted head and body movements throughout 
the experiment. The entire experiment, including introduction to the equip-
ment and task, practice and experimental trials, and debriefing, took approxi-
mately 35 minutes.
Eye movements were analyzed by playing the audio-video record back for 
each 33-millisecond frame on a Sony DSR-30 digital VCR. For the experimen-
tal trials, critical points in the speech stream were identified, corresponding to 
the onsets of the adjective and head noun, and the offset of the head noun. 
Continuous eye movements occurring from the beginning of the instruction 
were noted until the participant reached for the target object. Thus, the joint 
identification of critical points in the speech stream and the eye-movement data 
Table 10.2
Duration of modifier and noun in target instructions across conditions, in milliseconds. 
(Standard errors in parentheses.)
Scalar Material
Unreliable Reliable Unreliable Reliable
Adjective 288 (18) 289 (8) 351 (42) 372 (39)
Noun 378 (37) 373 (33) 332 (36) 355 (42)
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Figure 10.2
Eye-movement record in real time for scalar items. Horizontal axis depicts msec after 
adjective onset. In the no-contrast conditions the data labeled “contrast” indicate the 
second distracter item in the display.
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allowed for the alignment of eye movements to speech, as presented in the 
Results section below. For purposes of analysis, the work surface was divided 
into a 3 × 3 grid with visibly demarcated boundaries. Eye movements to an 
object were coded from the first frame in which a saccade was launched to the 
square containing that object. Occasionally, poor calibration or eye blinks re-
sulted in a temporary loss of tracking. If tracking resumed less than five video 
frames later and reappeared on the same location, the track was treated as con-
tinuous; otherwise, the eye-movement record noted the loss of tracking and, 
for that time period, treated the fixation as falling on none of the objects in the 
display.
Results
Trials in which a participant reached for the incorrect object or the participant 
fixated on the target at the beginning of the adjective were omitted from anal-
yses. The latter restriction was intended to exclude fixations on the target that 
were not initiated on the basis of speech input. Further, data points more than 
two standard deviations away from the mean for each condition and time frame 
were replaced with the mean for that condition. This affected 3.2 percent of the 
data.
Figure 10.2 depicts the proportion of trials including fixations to each of the 
objects in the display from the onset of the adjective. To correct for variability 
in the auditory duration of the modifier across stimuli, each trial was aligned to 
the offset of the adjective. Average offsets for the noun and the adjective in 
each condition are indicated. Critical comparisons were conducted over the 
500-msec window beginning 200 msec after adjective offset. This corresponds 
to where manipulations of discourse contrast have been observed in previous 
work. Analyses were performed for each modifier type separately. For scalar 
items, target advantage scores were computed by subtracting fixations to the 
competitor from fixations to the target over the critical interval. This provided 
a composite measure of the relative proportion of fixations to the entities that 
should be affected by the presence of a referential contrast. Figure 10.3 depicts 
target advantage scores for the scalar items. A 2 × 2 ANOVA crossing speaker 
type and the presence or absence of a contrasting object in the display resulted 
in an interaction significant in the participants analysis (F1(1,29) = 5.05, 
MSE = .043, p < .05), but not in the items analysis (F2(1,9) = 2.24, MSE = .032, 
p = .17). Planned comparisons for each type of speaker revealed that p erceivers 
responding to the reliable speaker benefited from the presence of a contextual 
contrast (F1(1,14) = 17.98, MSE = .024, p < .001; F2(1,9) = 4.6, MSE = .041, 
p < .05) but those responding to the unreliable speaker did not (F’s < 1). To 
establish the relative contributions to this pattern of looks to the target and the 
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competitor, additional analyses were conducted for fixations to each of these 
objects separately. Analysis of the proportion of fixations to the target pat-
terned similarly to target advantage scores. There was a trend toward an inter-
action of speaker and contrast marginal by participants (F(1,29) = 3.36, MSE = 
.01, p = .08), though not by items (F2(1,9) = 1.41, MSE = .01, p = .26). Inde-
pendent comparisons established that reliable speakers elicited significantly 
more looks to the target in the presence of a contrast (F1(1,14) = 11.9, MSE = 
.007, p < .01; F2(1,9) = 6.4, MSE = .01, p < .05) and unreliable speakers did 
not (F’s < 1). Proportions of fixations to the competitor also appear to have 
contributed to the interaction of target advantage scores. There was a marginal 
interaction by participants (F1(1,29) = 4.07, MSE = .019, p = .05), but not by 
items (F2(1,9) = 1.44, MSE = .021, p = .26). For the reliable speaker, there 
were fewer spurious looks to the competitor in the presence of a contrast 
(F1(1,14) = 15.2, MSE = .008, p < .01; F2(1,9) = 2.2, MSE = .026, p = .09). 
The manipulation of contrast did not affect fixations to the competitor for the 
unreliable speaker (F’s < .03).
Figure 10.4 portrays looks to objects in the display in response to instruc-
tions containing material modifiers. Target advantage scores were computed 
Figure 10.3
Target advantage scores for trials containing scalar adjectives over 500-msec interval 
region beginning 200 msec after adjective offset.
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Figure 10.4
Eye-movement record for the items containing material adjectives. Horizontal axis 
 depicts msec after adjective onset. In the no-contrast conditions the data labeled 
 “contrast” indicate the second distracter item in the display.
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Figure 10.4
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and submitted to a 2 × 2 ANOVA crossing speaker reliability and contextual 
contrast (see figure 10.5). This revealed a significant interaction by items 
(F2(1,9) = 9.03, MSE = .011, p < .05), but not by participants (F1(1,29) = 1.92, 
MSE = .048, p = .18). Planned comparisons demonstrated a marginally reli-
able trend for higher target advantage scores in the presence of a contrast for 
reliable speakers (F1(1,14) = 2.63, MSE = .036, p = .06; F2(1,9) = 2.3, MSE = 
.024, p = .08). In contrast, target advantage scores were numerically lower in 
the unreliable-speaker condition, though this trend was not reliable (F’s < 2.8). 
Just as for the scalar conditions, looks to the target and the competitor were 
analyzed separately. There were no clear effects or interactions for fixations to 
the target (F’s < .5). The absence of these effects and the relatively high target 
advantage scores likely reflect the tendency for individuals to identify the 
t arget extremely rapidly for the material modifiers. Looks to the competitor 
therefore provide a more sensitive indicator of the effect of contrast. Speaker 
type and contrast interacted reliably (F1(1,29) = 5.6, MSE = .011, p < .05; 
F2(1,9) = 18.4, MSE = .003, p < .01). In response to reliable speakers, there 
were fewer looks to the competitor when a contrasting object was in the d isplay 
(F(1,14) = 7.64, MSE = .013, = p < .05; F2(1,9) = 18.1, MSE = .004, p < .01). 
Figure 10.5
Target advantage scores for trials containing material adjectives over 500-msec interval 
region beginning 200 msec after adjective offset.
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This was not the case for individuals in the unreliable-speaker condition 
(F’s < .75).3
It was possible that perceivers in the unreliable-speaker condition might 
have delayed interpretive processes in light of the irregular instructions. To 
ensure that this was not the case, analyses were performed to establish when 
combined fixations to the competitor and the target, each of which matched the 
modifier property, diverged from looks to other objects in the display. In re-
sponse to the reliable speaker, participant fixations isolated the target and the 
competitor with marginal reliability between 67 and 100 msec after adjective 
offset (F(1,14) = 2.36, MSE = .009 p = .07). For instructions containing scalar 
modifiers, this divergence first occurred in the window between 200 and 233 
msec after adjective onset (F(1,14) = 2.43, MSE = .009, p = .07). For material 
modifiers, the difference was first observed between 33 and 66 msec (F(1,14) = 
2.04, MSE = .011, p = .09). Adjective-linked eye movements in response to 
the unreliable speaker were initially observed between 67 and 100 msec over 
all stimulus items (F(1,15) = 2.87, MSE = .005, p = .06), between 100 and 133 
msec for scalar conditions (F(1,15) = 2.04, MSE = .012, p = .09), and between 
67 and 100 msec for the material conditions (F(1,15) = 3.53, MSE = .033, 
p < .05). For every comparison given here, fixations to the target and the com-
petitor were significantly higher than to other objects in the display at each 
subsequent 33-msec analysis frame (F’s > 3.5, p’s < .05). In view of estimates 
that programming and launching a saccade takes approximately 200 msec 
(Matin, Shao, and Boff 1993), these comparisons indicate that participants in 
both conditions are using the speech input to incrementally fix reference before 
the offset of the modifier. Importantly, participants in the unreliable-speaker 
condition were at least as rapid to respond to the literal denotation of the mod-
ifier (and, in the case of the scalar adjectives, perhaps quicker) as those in the 
reliable-speaker condition. The unnaturalness of the speaker did not cause in-
terpretation to be any less incremental. Note too that eye movements were not 
retarded by the slightly faster material adjectives in the unreliable-speaker 
c ondition.
Discussion
The results demonstrate that speaker-specific attributes influence whether a 
restrictive modifier will be interpreted contrastively. In line with previous 
work, individuals in the reliable-speaker condition were aided in determining 
the referent for a restrictively modified nominal description by the presence of 
a contextual contrast. With scalar modification, there were more early looks to 
the target, and fewer looks to a competing object that matched the scalar prop-
erty. For the unreliable speaker, neither effect was observed. When the reliable 
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speaker uttered descriptions containing material modifiers, fewer looks were 
elicited to the competing object in the presence of a contrasting object. This too 
was not observed with the unreliable speaker. Thus, individuals were not aided 
by a contextual contrast when they had reason to believe a speaker did not use 
modification cooperatively. This is in accord with the view that participants in 
the unreliable-speaker condition did not take the presence of a modifier to 
i mply the existence of a contrast set. These participants were just as responsive 
to the literal meaning of the adjective as for the reliable speaker. The speaker 
manipulation selectively eliminated the generation of the contrastive implica-
ture licensed by the adjective.
That contrastive inferences can be eliminated by manipulating speaker reli-
ability provides strong support for a pragmatic interpretation of referential 
contrast effects, and furthermore implies that early inferencing admits episodic 
information. The speed of contrastive inferences therefore cannot be explained 
as an automatic reflex of deviating from an immutable default form. This is at 
odds with the most straightforward reading of the short-circuited implicature 
proposal introduced above. However, this result does not imply that i ndividuals 
are engaging in an overt counterfactual deductive reasoning process in order to 
use the contextual contrast appropriately. We return to this point in the general 
discussion.
Each modifier condition was similarly affected by speaker reliability and 
by contextual contrast. The presence of a contrast improved target identifica-
tion for both scalar and material conditions in response to reliable speakers. In 
both cases, the effect of referential contrast vanished with unreliable speakers. 
Thus the contrastive inference is pragmatic in origin for relational (scalar) and 
non-relational (material) modifiers alike. This rules out the possibility that 
s calar terms convey the expectation for contextual contrast as part of their lit-
eral meaning. If they did, then the contrast effect should not have been can-
celed by manipulating the pragmatic context of the modifier’s use. This is not 
to say that scalar and material adjectives were interpreted identically. Individ-
uals were somewhat slower to map scalar meanings to the subset of items that 
matched the modifier denotation. It is possible that the relational component of 
scalar meaning complicates the task of converging on a target. Parallel findings 
from a recent production study conducted in our laboratory found that more 
disfluencies occur before prenominal scalar modifiers than before material 
or color modifiers (Gregory, Grodner, Joshi, and Sedivy 2003). This is par-
ticularly striking in light of the fact that scalar terms are more frequent in 
both spoken and written corpora. Taken together, these observations buttress 
the thesis that scalar denotations are more conceptually complex than non-
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comparative adjective denotations. Investigating how the lexical semantics of 
various modifiers mediates reference resolution is an interesting direction for 
future research.
General Discussion
The results reported herein strengthen the case for a pragmatic explanation of 
referential contrast effects by demonstrating their defeasibility. In addition, 
they indicate that there is a limit to the generality of quantity-based inferences 
and that characteristics particular to a speaker are taken into account in the 
generation of referential contrast inferences. A number of questions remain 
open. For example, the results reviewed above do not address how perceivers’ 
expectations are updated or represented in a way that can influence early infer-
encing. It is interesting to speculate which cue to unreliability, or combination 
of cues, caused the attenuation of the contrast effect. One possibility is that 
perceivers’ inferences hinge directly on their overt beliefs about the degree to 
which the speaker is conforming to principles of rational, orderly communica-
tion. Hence, an awareness of the mistakes made by the speaker and the explicit 
identification of the speaker as non-normal defuse the contrastive inference. 
Perceivers may believe that the speaker’s impairment causes him to be an un-
cooperative or unreliable communicative partner and thus suspend any infer-
ences made on that basis.
A second possibility is that pragmatic inferencing reflects a more implicit 
assessment of the communicative proclivities of the speaker. For instance, per-
ceivers may attend to the statistics of modifier use for a particular speaker. 
Over the course of the experiment they would note that the presence of the 
adjective is not a reliable cue to contrast. As a result of the overuse of the 
modifier, they might recalibrate the anticipated default description to include a 
modifier. This view predicts that the effect of contrast might get weaker with 
repeated exposure to over-descriptive referring expressions (though it is un-
clear how much local experience might be necessary to override the prepotent 
contingency between modification and contextual modification). Anecdotal 
evidence from post-experimental debriefing suggests that perceivers do not 
register conscious awareness of the extent to which speakers exhibit optimally 
informative communicative behavior. When queried whether they noticed any-
thing unusual about the experiment, participants frequently mentioned trials in 
which objects were mislabeled or in which object destinations made reference 
to impossible configurations. They rarely if ever mentioned the over-explicit 
object labels. These observations hint that the speaker’s overspecified descrip-
tions did not have a large impact on the overt assessment of the reliability of 
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the speaker. Still, the speaker-specific modulations of the contrast effect could 
be attributable to high-level beliefs about speaker characteristics, lower-level 
statistical properties of the speakers output, or some combination of both. If 
only high-level cues are needed to indicate speaker unreliability, then p erceivers 
need not learn about the particular way in which the present speaker is uninfor-
mative, and should suspend the computation of a broad range of implicit mean-
ings. Further, there should be no evidence of greater reduction in the contrast 
effect as the perceiver accumulates evidence of over-informativity. On the 
other hand, sensitivity to lower-level cues should result in incremental changes 
to how perceivers respond to the descriptive patterns used by a speaker as more 
tokens of speaker descriptions are encountered.
To evaluate these alternatives, exploratory analyses were conducted com-
paring performance on items in the first and the second halves of the ex-
periment. The hypotheses differ with respect to their predictions for the 
reliable-speaker conditions. To see why this is so, note that reliable speakers 
uttered modified forms to refer to competitors as often as they did to pick out a 
member of a contrasting pair (for ten items across the 56 experimental trials in 
each case). Hence, there was no reliable contingency between modification 
and contextual contrast for the reliable-speaker condition. Thus, over the 
course of the experiment, perceivers may have come to adjust their expecta-
tions about the information conveyed by modification as a result of encounter-
ing a significant number of modified forms in the absence of contrast. The 
unreliable speaker, on the other hand, consistently used over-specific forms on 
a much large number of trials, with 15 modified forms occurring in the absence 
of contrast even before the first experimental item. Therefore, statistics corre-
sponding to the overuse of the modifier may have already been adjusted on the 
expected referential form by the point at which inferential processes could be 
assessed in the first half of the experiment.
The most interesting measure for the reliable speaker was looks to the com-
petitor for scalar items, depicted in figure 10.6. The interaction of contrast and 
block order was marginal (F(1,13) = 3.61, MSE = .021, p = .08). Consistent 
with the statistical tuning hypothesis, looks to the competitor were reduced in 
the presence of a contrast in the first block of the experiment (F(1,13) = 7.41, 
MSE = .031, p < .05), but not in the second (F < 1). There were no effects of 
contrast or interactions with block order for the unreliable speaker (F’s < 1.5). 
Two caveats are in order: The present experiment was not specifically designed 
to test these hypotheses and no other measure differed reliably across blocks. 
Still this trend is suggestive that overuse of the modifier contributes to the 
elimination of the contrast effect.
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Figure 10.6
Looks to competitor object over interval 200 –700 msec after noun onset for scalar 
items across first and second blocks of experiment. Top and bottom panels represent 
data from the reliable and unreliable speaker conditions, respectively.
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A follow-up study delved further into the source of the pragmatic effect. 
A reliable-speaker condition was compared against two unreliable speaker-
conditions. In one of these unreliable conditions, the speaker overused pre-
nominal modifiers consistently just as in the present experiment. In the other, 
the speaker encoded the same redundant content as the prenominal condition, 
but did so with a postnominal modifier (e.g., “Pick up the cup that’s tall”). As 
in the previous experiment, critical trials tested instructions containing pre-
nominal modifiers for all three conditions. But in contrast with the first experi-
ment, none of the explicit cues to speaker irregularity were given. If perceivers 
are sensitive to the redundancy of content, then both unreliable speaker types 
should result in a reduction of the contrast effect. If perceivers are especially 
sensitive to a redundancy of a particular form, then the excessive use of the 
prenominal modifier should result in a greater reduction of the contrast effect 
than the postnominal condition. It is also possible that high-level knowledge of 
the speaker’s impairment would be necessary to draw attention to low-level 
redundancies in the present study. If so, then there might not be a marked re-
duction in the effect of contrast.
Figure 10.7 depicts target advantage scores for instructions containing scalar 
terms over the same temporal region analyzed in the present experiment. For 
all three conditions there was an apparent benefit of the presence of a contrast 
in identifying the target. This was significant by participants and items for the 
reliable speaker (F1(1,18) = 5.16, MSE = .05, p < .05; F2(1,9) = 5.48, MSE = 
.02, p < .05), and by participants for the condition with excessive prenominal 
modification (F1(1,18) = 3.87, MSE = .03, p < .05; F2(1,9) = 1.28, MSE = .03, 
p = .14). Though a similar trend was observable for the condition with exces-
sive postnominal modification, it was marginally reliable only in the items 
analysis (F1(1,16) = 1.59, MSE = .09, p = .11; F2(1,9) = 2.44, MSE = .04, p = 
.08). There was no hint of an interaction between speaker type and contrast 
(F’s < .5). This work demonstrates that overusing restrictive modification is 
not sufficient by itself to eradicate the contrastive interpretation of scalar mod-
ifiers. This does not immediately imply that the high-level cues to speaker reli-
ability were solely responsible for defusing the expectation of contrast in the 
earlier experiment. It is possible that high-level cues were necessary to draw 
the listener’s attention to the low-level redundancy. It is also possible that the 
pattern observed in the follow-up experiment was unique to scalar modifiers, 
which are inherently comparative.
Another open question is what kind of pragmatic mechanism could be re-
sponsible for the above findings. A Gricean explanation for contrastive inter-
pretations of restrictive modifiers claims that perceivers make the following 
inferential steps when a speaker utters a modified description:
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(i) If the speaker means to use this utterance to pick out an intended referent in 
a context with only one entity of that type, then a default description would be 
the most natural means to do so.
(ii) The speaker chose a more specific description than the default by using a 
modified referential phrase.
(iii) If the speaker is behaving cooperatively, he should not be more informa-
tive than is necessary. Overspecification must have some purpose.
(iv) Because of (ii) and (iii), the conditions for uttering a default form in (i) 
must not hold. That is, it must not be the case that perceiver intends the utter-
ance of the modified form to pick out an entity in isolation.
One possible conclusion of (i)–(iv) is (v):
(v) There are multiple entities in the context of the same type.
There are a number of challenges inherent to implementing this sort of reason-
ing in a real-time processing system. For one, it is not clear what kind of rea-
soning system would permit arriving at (v) as rapidly as perceivers do. That is, 
Figure 10.7
Target advantage scores elicited by instructions containing scalar terms uttered by a 
speaker who use modification reliably (N = 19), a speaker who used prenominal modi-
fication excessively (N = 19), and a speaker who used postnominal modification exces-
sively (N = 17).
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given step (iii), what ranges of “purposes” for the inclusion of modification are 
considered, and what weight is each of them given? It is certainly not the case 
that distinguishing between like entities is the only or even the most frequent 
function of modification. (See Fox and Thompson 1990 for a taxonomy of 
functions of relative-clause modifiers.) Second, a critical step is embedded in 
(ii). How does the system decide the appropriate alternative to compute and 
compare to a given referential expression? For instance, “the plastic cup” is a 
more specific description than “the plastic entity,” yet intuition tells us that 
the contrastive entity invoked is another cup and not another plastic object. 
The comparison of alternative forms is even more impressive when we con-
sider that it is occurring incrementally even before the noun is encountered. A 
partial answer to both of these questions might be that statistical regularities 
constrain the consideration of alternative expressions and their functions, and 
indeed that inferential steps may be statistically linked. This would permit the 
processor to bypass the complexity inherent in reasoning about alternatives 
c ounterfactually.
Let us sketch one way this approach might work to account for the currently 
known facts about contrastive inferences. First, determining the referential 
forms to be compared could be a function of patterns of co-occurrence among 
properties in referential descriptions. Modifiers are more promiscuous than 
nouns. “Plastic” will be used to modify a wide variety of artifact labels, 
whereas “cup” will be used to describe a narrow set of object referents. The 
most accessible default for “the plastic cup” is “the cup” rather than “the plas-
tic thing” because the descriptions in which “cup” participates form a more 
coherent set of properties than the descriptions in which “plastic” participates. 
This would explain our intuitions about the dimension along which a contrast 
set differs from the referent set. Whether or not an expression that is actually 
used deviates from the expected default could be computed from the likelihood 
of using a modifier encoding some specific property together with a particular 
noun. For instance, the ratio of expressions encoding yellowness as a property 
given the total occurrences of a noun such as “banana” would presumably be 
lower than the ratio of encoding “yellow” given “notebook.” Thus, “yellow 
banana” would represent more of a deviation from the expected default than 
“yellow notebook,” triggering a search for some function to the modifier. The 
preferred function (i.e. referentially contrasting) could be arrived at via a sta-
tistical link between steps (ii) and (v) (though note that this statistical link 
r emains to be empirically established, given the observations in Fox and 
Thompson). Clearly this is an extremely partial sketch of how the aforemen-
tioned challenges might be met. Our present purpose is merely to point to po-
tential directions for realizing a reasoning system that is flexible enough to 
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consider situation-based information, but sufficiently constrained to operate in 
real time.
There are at least two points in the process outlined above at which speaker-
specific effects could have influenced the present experiment. One is to directly 
recalibrate the default form at step (ii) for a particular speaker on the basis of 
statistical regularities in the recent episodic record. An alternative that seems 
more computationally cumbersome is to generate expectations of defaults more 
generally in step (ii) as a function of global experience across many speakers, 
and then to invoke the criterion in (iii) as a prerequisite to identifying the most 
likely function for the modifier. In the former case, speaker-particular regulari-
ties for the speakers in the experiment reported above might be used to cali-
brate expectations about default expressions. That is, modified descriptions 
would count as deviations from the expected default for reliable speakers, but 
not for unreliable speakers. This type of rapid calibration to characteristics of 
a speaker’s speech could be similar to the low-level acoustic calibration that is 
automatically achieved to take into account speaker characteristics such as age 
and gender, allowing perceivers to cope efficiently with speaker variability. 
The second alternative posits that the use of a modified phrase would count as 
a deviation from the default in both speaker conditions; however, step (iii) 
would then be invoked, and the determination of a speaker’s unreliability with 
respect to communicative norms would suspend a search for an appropriate 
function for the modifier. This latter explanation is more computationally 
 complex, and is not able to exploit direct statistical links between steps (ii) 
and (v).
Our follow-up experiment attempts to distinguish between these two expla-
nations. Thus far, the results suggest that a determination of speaker reliability 
(i.e. step (iii)) may not be entirely dispensable in accounting for contrast set 
inferences. Further research is needed to determine whether overt signaling of 
speaker unreliability or uncooperativeness is both necessary and sufficient to 
suspend the process of forming contrastive inferences, as well as what sorts of 
evidence can be used to make this determination.
Another way of exploring the explanatory power of statistical regularities in 
generating pragmatic inferences is to examine whether perceivers’ generation 
of a contrastive implicature depends on the identification of plausible alterna-
tive functions of modifiers. To test this theory, it would be interesting to see if 
a pragmatic manipulation that did not alter the cue validity of a modifier could 
defuse the contrastive implicature. Consider the sentence in (5) uttered within 
a discourse where a woman is trying and failing to reach a cup on a shelf.
(5) The short woman could not reach the cup on the top shelf.
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The modifier provides a causal explanation for the prominent event. Intuitively 
no contrasting woman is conjured by this example. It is possible that the pre-
potent identifying function of the modifier initially results in a contrastive in-
terpretation, which is later retracted on the basis of secondary deliberative 
processes. Alternatively, one might see no evidence of contrast inferences in 
initial referential commitments, which would suggest that the identification of 
alternative functions comes into play before the conclusion reached in step (v). 
This could be implemented either at step (ii), in allowing relevance-based con-
siderations to constrain expected default expressions, or at step (iii), once a 
deviation from the expected expressions triggers a search for plausible func-
tions for that deviation. Careful temporally sensitive experimentation along 
these lines has the potential to clarify the computation of pragmatic inferences 
that have hitherto been addressed primarily by theoretical linguists. Represen-
tational distinctions have been posited between encoded content implicit con-
tent, and between generalized and particularized implicature. These formal 
distinctions provide useful starting points for formulating processing hypoth-
eses. Further investigation along these lines will allow us to gain ground in 
understanding which parts of the inferential process are generated automati-
cally and which parts are computed ad hoc.
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Notes
1. Here and throughout, we use the term “inference” to refer to information that is com-
municated to the perceiver via the utterance of an expression, but which is not part of 
its asserted content. This would include both accommodated presuppositions and impli-
catures. We adopt this term because it is neutral with respect to whether the inferred 
content arises from the conventional or implicated meaning of the critical expression.
2. This example is adapted from Levinson 2000.
3. Figure 10.4 suggests that there were frequent looks to the second distracter (labeled 
as “contrast”) before adjective offset in the unreliable-speaker no-contrast condition. 
Though proportion of fixations appears to be elevated relative to looks to the other 
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distracter, this difference is not significant (F’s < 1.7). There are also no such elevated 
fixations for the reliable-speaker no-contrast condition. Further, the elevation occurs 
extremely early (200 msec before adjective offset), which makes it unlikely that it was 
affected by the critical description.
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